Affaire Medpoint : « La justice des hommes et la justice divine ont triomphé…Pravind Jugnauth gagne son appel »

Par Madiba

• A suivre les points saillants du jugement …

Pravind Jugnauth est un homme heureux. Le leader du MSM est un homme libre depuis la décision de la Cour Suprême hier. Minority Voice est satisfait du jugement du Chef Juge Keshoe Parsad Matadeen et le juge Asraf Caunhye. Nous ne pouvons passer sous silence les « strong wording » qui constituent une gifle magistrale au jugement de la Cour Intermédiaire. Sir Anerood Jugnauth, ancien magistrat et Queen’s Counsel a fustigé les mauvais jugements de certains magistrats qui n’ont pas assez d’expérience et qui prennent des décisions « bric, brac» . Ameenah Gurib-Fakim a agi sur les recommandations du Premier ministre sir Anerood Jugnauth en vertu des articles 59(3) et 62 de la Constitution. Pravind Jugnauth prêtera serment jeudi matin 26 mai à la State House.

Pour rappel, le chef juge Kheshoe Parsad Matadeen et le juge Asraf Caunhye, ont cassé le jugement de la cour intermédiaire condamnant Pravind Jugnauth à 12 mois de prison pour conflit d’intérêts dans l’affaire MedPoint. C’est la cour intermédiaire qui lui avait infligé cette peine le 30 juin 2015. Pravind Jugnauth avait été reconnu coupable de conflit d’intérêts dans l’affaire MedPoint.
Pravind Jugnauth se trouvait alors au Bureau du Premier ministre, soit quelques minutes après que la Cour suprême a renversé le jugement de la cour intermédiaire le condamnant à 12 mois de prison dans l’affaire MedPoint. « J’étais tout le temps confiant qu’il n’y avait pas de “case” contre Pravind Jugnauth. C’était un mauvais jugement [en première instance]. La justice a triomphé. Aujourd’hui, la Cour suprême m’a donné raison.

Le Premier ministre sir Anerood Jugnauth a déclaré aussi que la présentation du Budget 2016-17, initialement prévue le 6 juin, sera probablement repoussée à une date ultérieure Cette décision fait suite à la nomination d’un nouveau ministre des Finances en la personne de Pravind Jugnauth ; décision prise mercredi soir 25 mai par la présente de la République Ameenah Gurib-Fakim sur recommandations du Premier ministre, quelques heures après le jugement de la Cour suprême dans le procès en appel du leader du MSM dans l’affaire MedPoint.

« D’abord, je dis un merci à tous les amis pour leur présence et pour m’avoir soutenu. C’est un grand soulagement. C’est un sentiment personnel », explique Pravind Jugnauth Ce sont là les premiers mots de Pravind Jugnauth, qui a réuni la presse au Sun Trust à 16 h 30 mercredi 25 mai après que la Cour suprême a renversé le jugement de la cour intermédiaire le condamnant à 12 mois de prison dans l’affaire MedPoint. « Je dois surtout remercier Dieu, et tous ceux qui m’ont soutenu, y compris les avocats et avoués », affirme Pravind Jugnauth. Il remercie aussi le leader des deux partenaires du MSM au sein de l’alliance Lepep, en l’occurrence Ivan Collendavelloo et Xavier-Luc Duval : « Ils m’ont appelé après le jugement » ; ajoutant que « tout au long » il a obtenu le soutien de son épouse et de ses enfants.

« Je suis enchanté pour Pravind Jugnauth, tant au plan personnel que sur le plan politique, ainsi que pour sa famille. C’est aussi un développement positif pour l’équipe gouvernementale », a déclaré le no 2 du gouvernement, Xavier Luc Duval.

«Je suis extrêmement content pour Pravind. C’est avant tout un très bon ami… » C’est là la première réaction de Roshi Bhadain après la victoire de Pravind Jugnauth dans l’affaire MedPoint.

Voici les points saillants du jugement :
It was submitted that the learned Magistrates were wrong to proceed on the basis that the appellant’s sister’s shareholding in Medpoint Ltd meant that she held a “personal interest” in the decision relating to the payment to be made to the company. The interests of a shareholder and the interests of a company are distinct and separate. As a result, the learned Magistrates were wrong to disregard the separate personality of the company. The learned Magistrates wrongly conflated the appellant’s sister’s interest in Medpoint Ltd with Medpoint Ltd’s interest in its contract with the Government.

Additionally, the learned Magistrates’ finding on the issue of “personal interest” was glaringly flawed because the Ministerial decision was not one to “find funds” but one to approve the reallocation of funds, which had already been previously earmarked, from one source to another. The learned Magistrates clearly failed to make this crucial distinction in their appreciation of the evidence before them in determining the issue of interest.

As was expressly recognised by the learned Magistrates themselves, the decision to reallocate funds was “… at the very last stage of the whole process, when all major steps had already been fulfilled for the acquisition of Medpoint site and decision to pay had already been taken. The sole decision that had to be taken at that stage and in which accused confirmed having participated is the source of funds for the agreed payment to Medpoint Ltd.” Therefore, it stands to reason, having regard to the above sequence of events, that the decision taken by the appellant to approve a reallocation of funds at the stage after funds had been identified, after the payment deadline had been determined, after the contract had been awarded and after the contract amount had been determined could not possibly have resulted in any “personal interest” to his sister.

The sum of Rs 144,701,300 was already due to be paid by Government and there was already an available and identified source of payment which was MOFED’s Lottery Fund. By affixing his signature to the minute, the appellant approved the proposal to use MOHQL’s savings as the source of funding the payment rather than MOFED’s Lottery Fund. It was an internal administrative decision which was merely concerned with an allocation choice between two possible sources of funding, resulting in payment being effected from another available source. It was not a decision to “find” or “identify” funds, as erroneously found by the learned Magistrates.

Having ascertained that the decision had already been taken to pay, no situation of conflict could arise with regard to the obligation to pay. It was no longer an issue that Medpoint Ltd was entitled to the payment of Rs 144,710,300. Government had not only taken the decision to award the contract to Medpoint Ltd but had also expressly bound itself to effect payment to Medpoint Ltd. The only remaining issue was payment of the sum in question. The interest of Medpoint Ltd to obtain payment of that sum had already been secured since 14 December 2010, well before the appellant affixed his signature for the approval of the reallocation of funds. As we have found earlier, the decision to reallocate funds could not in the least have affected the interest of Medpoint Ltd.

Section 13(2) of the Act is not concerned with any perception of bias but creates a criminal offence which requires the prosecution to prove an actual conflict of interest when the public official takes part in a decision-making process including the personal interest of a relative. There must not be merely an apparent conflict of interest. Whilst the test for apparent bias is appropriate to determine the impartiality of an adjudicating tribunal or an administrative body entrusted with a statutory decision-making process as in Porter v Magill (supra) or in Khedun -Sewgobind v The Public Service Commission [2010 SCJ 6a], the same principle or test would not apply to the proof of a criminal offence under section 13(2) of the Act.

The learned Magistrates erred when they proceeded to convict the appellant based on an apparent conflict of interest. Section 13(2) of the Act does not criminalise apparent conflicts of interest but actual conflicts of interest, to which the learned Magistrates utterly failed to apply their minds.

This ground hinges on the mental element aspect of the offence and reproaches the learned Magistrates of having failed to properly appreciate the mental element required for the offence to be proved.

We, therefore, hold that the presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person can be convicted of an offence under section 13(2) has neither been rebutted by any express provision in the Act nor by necessary implication.

It is not the least surprising, therefore, that the prosecution chose to aver all the ingredients of mens rea in the information against the appellant. The charge brought by the prosecution against the appellant is that the appellant acted “willfully”, “unlawfully” and “criminally”. Thus, the charge which the appellant had to answer and to which he pleaded expressly mentions that full mens rea is required.

The approach adopted by the learned Magistrates with regard to the mental element is, accordingly, flawed in several respects. >They were clearly wrong to treat the offence under section 13(2) and (3) as being an absolute offence creating an absolute prohibition. They failed to recognise that the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt the requisite mental element on the part of the appellant in order to establish his guilt at the material time of the commission of the offence in conformity with section 13(2) of the Act.

This approach adopted by the learned Magistrates is wrong in law. The use of the words “shall not” by the legislator does not operate to exclude the need to establish “mens rea” or “a guilty intent” for the purpose of establishing an offence under section 13(2) of the Act. The learned Magistrates failed to appreciate the presumption that it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove mens rea in relation to all the constitutive elements of the offence. Such presumption had not been displaced expressly by any statutory provision nor by necessary implication.

As a result of the misdirections in law under (a) above, the legal approach adopted by the learned Magistrates was vitiated and defective from the outset. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had the requisite guilty intent in respect of all the prohibited acts which constitute an offence under section 13(2). No such finding was reached by the learned Magistrates.

True it is that the learned Magistrates found that the appellant knew that his sister possessed an interest “ in Medpoint Ltd ” and also knew that his decision to approve the reallocation of funds related to the payment of Medpoint Ltd. However, it cannot be said that they found the requisite mens rea in respect of all the conduct elements of the offence, in particular the third conduct element, proved beyond reasonable doubt. What they found was that the appellant must have known that his sister was a shareholder. This cannot, de facto, be equated or stretched to a finding that he knew that she had any “ personal interest” in the decision to reallocate funds and that he knowingly participated in a decision-making process involving a conflict of interest.

The learned Magistrates erred in law in misconstruing the requisite mens rea and as a result failed to make a proper assessment of the criminal and guilty intent of the appellant which had to be established beyond reasonable doubt in respect of all the composite elements of an offence of conflict of interests under section 13(2) of the Act;

In these circumstances, it was highly questionable whether the appellant had the requisite guilty intent at the material time that he participated in a decision limited solely to a reallocation of the funds for payment to which Medpoint Ltd was already lawfully entitled, the more so when this was done at a time and in a situation where there was a total absence of any competing interests or conflict of interests.

In view of all the above, we hold that: (a) the learned Magistrates erred in law in misconstruing the requisite mens rea and as a result failed to make a proper assessment of the criminal and guilty intent of the appellant which had to be established beyond reasonable doubt in respect of all the composite elements of an offence of conflict of interests under section 13(2) of the Act;

(c) the learned Magistrates erred in law when they failed to consider whether the appellant may have been acting in the bona fide execution of his duty as Minister of Finance in approving the proposal for reallocation of funds essentially to suit the internal financial and administrative convenience of the Ministry and in the absence of any conflict of interest.

It necessarily follows that the appeal must also succeed under ground 1. For all the reasons we have given above, we allow the appeal and quash the conviction, and the sentence of the Intermediate Court. We make no order as to costs.

K.P. Matadeen
Chief Justice
A.A. Caunhye
Judge
25 May 2016

Posted by Minority Voice on May 25 2016. Filed under Actualités, En Direct, Featured, Politique. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0. You can leave a response or trackback to this entry